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The Dangerous Right to Food Choice 
Samuel R. Wiseman* 
ABSTRACT 
Scholars, advocates, and interest groups have grown increasingly 
concerned with the ways in which government regulations—from agri-
cultural subsidies to food safety regulations to licensing restrictions on 
food trucks—affect access to local food. One argument emerging from 
the interest in recent years is that choosing what foods to eat, what I have 
previously called “liberty of palate,” is a fundamental right.1 The attrac-
tion is obvious: infringements of fundamental rights trigger strict scruti-
ny, which few statutes survive. As argued elsewhere, the doctrinal case 
for the existence of such a right is very weak. This Essay does not revisit 
those arguments, but instead suggests that if a right to food liberty were 
recognized, the chief beneficiaries would not likely be sustainable agri-
culture consumers and producers, but rather those with the most at stake 
(and the most expensive lawyers)—big agriculture and large food manu-
facturers. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For a variety of reasons, including concerns relating to health, taste, 
and the environment, Americans have grown increasingly interested in 
fresh, healthy, local foods and sustainable agriculture. Scholars, advo-
cates, and interest groups have, in turn, grown increasingly concerned 
with the ways in which government regulations—from agricultural sub-
sidies to food safety regulations to licensing restrictions on food trucks—
affect access to local food. Understandably so. Navigating even well-
justified regulatory requirements can be a significant burden for both 
new and small producers, and, given the size, wealth, and organization of 
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 1. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Liberty of Palate, 65 ME. L. REV. 737 (2013). 
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large food industry actors, there is reason to suspect that some regula-
tions reflect large food industry interests rather than those of the more 
numerous, but dispersed, consumers. In light of this dynamic, and the 
importance of the issues involved, it is understandable that advocates for 
local food and consumer choice would seek novel legal arguments to 
allow them to press their claims in court. One such argument that has 
emerged in recent years is that choosing what foods to eat, what I have 
previously called “liberty of palate,” is a fundamental right.2 The attrac-
tion is obvious: infringements of fundamental rights trigger strict scruti-
ny,3 which few policies survive.4 
I have argued in previous work that the doctrinal case for the exist-
ence of such a right is very weak.5 My goal here is to suggest that if a 
right to food liberty were recognized, the chief beneficiaries would not 
likely be sustainable agriculture consumers and producers, but rather 
those with the most at stake (and the most expensive lawyers)—big agri-
culture and large food manufacturers. Recent experience with the First 
Amendment has reminded us that judicial enforcement of fundamental 
rights can be a powerful weapon for industry. The First Amendment pro-
tects familiar, cherished rights to proclaim political views in public spac-
es, yet it also has been used to strike down campaign finance laws,6 to-
bacco warning labels,7 and drug marketing regulations.8 And in the food 
context, it has been invoked to block mandated disclosure of milk pro-
duced from cows treated with bovine growth hormones.9 Although they 
                                                            
 2. See Wiseman, supra note 1. 
 3. The strict scrutiny test varies slightly in different contexts, but in general the test requires 
that policies consist of “narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.” 
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 4. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709–10, 
748 (2007) (finding that “student assignment plans that rely upon race to determine which public 
schools certain children may attend” fail to survive strict scrutiny Equal Protection review); Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249–50, 275–76 (2003) (finding that “the University of Michigan’s use of 
racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violate[s] the Equal Protection Clause” under strict 
scrutiny review); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 806 (2000) (under strict 
scrutiny review, finding that a federal statute that required “cable television operators who provide 
channels ‘primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming’ either to ‘fully scramble or other-
wise fully block’ those channels or to limit their transmission to hours when children are unlikely to 
be viewing, set by administrative regulation as the time between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.,” violated the 
First Amendment (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 561(a) (1994 ed. Supp. III)). 
 5. See Wiseman, supra note 1. 
 6. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2009). 
 7. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012). 
 8. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310; see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 
(2011). 
 9. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 73–74 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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enjoy economies of scale by virtue of their size, large food industry ac-
tors have by far the most to gain by reducing their regulatory burden 
through legal challenges.10 And because strict scrutiny is so demanding, 
they would likely succeed, with results antithetical to the values es-
poused by many in the sustainable food movement.11 
In many cases, it would be very difficult for governments regulat-
ing food to show that a particular threat to health, for example, was seri-
ous enough to amount to a compelling interest. And even when an inter-
est is clearly compelling, such as protecting consumers from salmonella 
poisoning, it would be difficult to prove that the regulations were nar-
rowly tailored to meet that compelling interest. More broadly, agencies 
that already face resource constraints, and are increasingly ossified12 due 
to detailed procedural constraints, will face yet another hurdle in court, 
thus further chilling regulatory activity. While there are both good and 
bad food regulations, strict scrutiny is too blunt an instrument to separate 
them. 
This Essay explores the normative aspects of the argument for a 
fundamental right to food choice, arguing that the food movement stands 
to lose more than it would gain, and suggesting that a better approach lies 
in the slow, and often frustrating, process of debating food-based issues 
on a case-by-case basis. Part II of this Essay explores a nonexhaustive 
array of food-related policies affecting large and small producers as well 
as consumers. Part III focuses on the likely downsides of a right to food 
choice, describing the effect of strict scrutiny review on the policies in 
                                                            
 10. It is of course difficult to empirically prove this assertion, but the limited but growing use 
of the First Amendment to delegitimize other food and drug regulations, discussed infra accompany-
ing notes 70–72, so far suggests that large industry actors are the most likely to successfully take 
advantage of constitutional provisions to protect their concentrated, valuable interests. For a theoret-
ical public choice argument regarding the likelihood that large, organized, wealthy interests are more 
likely to use the courts to their advantage than are small, dispersed interests, see, e.g., Einer R. 
Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 
67-68 (1991) (“[T]he same interest groups that have an organizational advantage in collecting re-
sources to influence legislators and agencies generally also have an organizational advantage in 
collecting resources to influence the courts. Increasing the lawmaking power of the courts may only 
exacerbate the influence of interest groups.”); but see Patrick Luff, Captured Legislatures and Pub-
lic-Interested Courts, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 519 (2013) (arguing that structural and other differences 
make courts somewhat more immune to problems identified by public choice theory); infra note 67 
(describing a case brought by a small farmer and the Institute for Justice).  
 11. See Stephanie Tai, The Rise of U.S. Food Sustainability Litigation, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1069, 1076–78 (2012) (documenting a variety of goals and values associated with the sustainable 
food movement, including avoiding the health and environmental effects of the use of chemicals in 
food production, limiting “food miles” to reduce energy use and increase access to fresh food and 
support for local farmers, and the enjoyment of fresh, natural, and sustainably produced foods). 
 12. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385, 1387 (1992). 
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Part II, from bans on carcinogens and trans fats in foods to animal wel-
fare laws that require humane conditions for farm-raised chickens. I ar-
gue that large industry actors, rather than local and healthy food propo-
nents, would be the main beneficiaries of a fundamental right to food 
choice. In conclusion, Part IV suggests an alternative, less aggressive 
path that is not as exciting or transformative as a fundamental right, but 
that would likely better serve many of the values expressed within the 
burgeoning sustainable food movement. 
II. GOVERNMENT AND FOOD 
The government has long influenced the food supply, issuing food 
safety regulations in response to public demand—as occurred after Up-
ton Sinclair’s novel The Jungle described grossly unsanitary slaughtering 
and meatpacking processes13—and providing billions of dollars in agri-
cultural subsidies. More recently, Congress, through the Food Safety 
Modernization Act (FSMA),14 greatly expanded the authority of the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate food production in an effort 
to prevent contamination of the food supply. Beyond traditional agricul-
tural subsidies issued to large farms, the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) also influences certain food practices through its small, albeit 
growing, support of small agricultural operations by funding direct sales 
operations and supporting the use of food stamps at farmers’ markets.15 
This Part explores several areas of government interaction with all levels 
of the food production and delivery system, and resistance to some of 
these regulations from large and small producers, among others. 
A. Food Safety Laws 
Congress, the FDA, and a number of state legislatures and regulato-
ry agencies have enacted a wide variety of laws designed to protect the 
public from illness and death caused by contaminated food and danger-
ous additives. Federal laws require meat to be sent to certified slaughter-
houses;16 prohibit certain dangerous additives to food;17 and, most recent-
                                                            
 13. See generally UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906). 
 14. Food Safety Modernization Act, 21 U.S.C. § 350h (2011). 
 15. USDA Food & Nutrition Serv., USDA Expands Support for Farmers Markets to Accept 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Benefits, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Feb. 3, 2014), 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/pressrelease/2013/fns-000813; Megan Galey & A. Brian Endres, Locating 
the Boundaries of Sustainable Agriculture, 17 NEXUS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 3, 32 (2012) (describing 
other grant programs that support small and sustainable agriculture). 
 16. See Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1901 (1958); Poultry Products Inspec-
tion Act, 21 U.S.C. § 455 (1968); Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 605 (1906). 
 17. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1997). 
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ly, require farmers to implement certain safe growing, harvesting, and 
packing practices on farms to better prevent produce contamination.18 In 
draft regulations issued under the FSMA, the FDA directs farms to en-
sure that workers harvesting produce wash their hands, for example, and 
does not allow crops to be harvested immediately after manure has been 
applied to them.19 The FDA also bans interstate sales of raw milk.20 At 
the local level, a number of jurisdictions have implemented trans fats 
bans,21 and the FDA has recently made a tentative determination that 
trans fats are no longer “generally recognized as safe,” which would pre-
vent them from being legally added to foods.22 
While groups of doctors, food safety public interest groups, and 
others have lobbied for and supported these laws, they have also faced 
increasing resistance. Small and sustainable farms argue that certain pro-
visions in the FSMA are infeasible. For example, they worry that farmers 
would be unable to comply with both the FSMA manure and compost 
application standards and USDA organic certification standards due to 
conflicting manure application provisions.23 Further, they are concerned 
that implementing the host of requirements associated with safe handling 
and packing of produce would be overly burdensome for small farmers.24 
                                                            
 18. See Food Safety Modernization Act, 21 U.S.C. § 350h (2011). 
 19. Standards for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce for Human Con-
sumption, 78 Fed. Reg. 3504-01 (proposed Jan. 16, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 16 and 
112). 
 20. See Wiseman, supra note 1, at 739–40 (describing food bans around the United States). 
 21. 21 C.F.R. § 1240.61 (2012). 
 22. See Notice, Tentative Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils; Request for 
Comments and for Scientific Data and Information, 78 Fed. Reg. 67169 (Nov. 8, 2013). 
 23. See, e.g., Comment, Nat’l Organic Coal., Re: Comment On the Proposed Rule for Stand-
ards for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce for Human Consumption; and 
Comments on the Proposed Rule for Current Good Manufacturing Practice and Hazard Analysis and 
Risk-Based Preventative Controls for Human Food (Nov. 26, 2013) (“If FDA adopts these intervals 
in the final rule and does not change these intervals to align with NOP [USDA National Organic 
Program] requirements, then FDA will be forcing organic farmers out of compliance with NOP 
regulations and actively endangering the current organic of farmers as well as discouraging farmers 
from becoming certified organic.”); see also Samuel R. Wiseman, The Implementation of the Food 
Safety Modernization Act and the Power of the Food Safety Movement, AM. J. L. & MED. (forthcom-
ing 2015) (describing and summarizing more comments). 
 24. See, e.g., Comment, Slow Food USA, Re: Comments On the Proposed Rule for Standards 
for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce for Human Consumption; and Com-
ments on the Proposed Rule for Current Good Manufacturing Practice and Hazard Analysis and 
Risk-Based Preventative Controls for Human Food (Oct. 31, 2013) (noting that burdens of farmers 
having to register with and comply with the rule); Ohio Ecological Farm & Food Ass’n, Proposed 
Rule Current Good Manufacturing Practice and Hazard Analysis and Risk-Based Preventive Con-
trols for Human Food: FDA-2011-N-0920; and Standards for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing and 
Holding of Produce for Human Consumption: FDA-2011-N-0921 (Nov. 15, 2013) (expressing simi-
lar concerns). 
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Congress25 and the FDA26 responded to a number of these concerns, per-
haps because certain large agricultural interests, which public choice the-
ory27 would predict have a much larger influence on legislation and regu-
lations in this area, aligned with those of small farms.28 Certain large ag-
ricultural interests and small farms also both opposed certain stringent 
safety standards that they viewed as unduly cumbersome and expen-
sive.29 However, other provisions in recent food safety legislation passed 
despite only benefitting small farms: Congress exempted small farms 
from many of the food safety regulations,30 and the FDA defined small 
farms broadly to include any farm with $25,000 or less in annual sales of 
produce.31 In this case, small farmers, despite lacking the organization 
and resources of large agricultural lobbyists, had sufficient stakes in the 
outcome of the policy to overcome organizational barriers, and Congress 
and the FDA responded. 
Other groups have objected to food safety regulations because they 
believe that certain foods labeled as dangerous are in fact healthy, and 
that individuals should have a right to choose the foods that they con-
sume, even if the government deems these foods unsafe. For example, 
consumers of raw milk sued the FDA in 2012, unsuccessfully arguing 
that raw milk is both safe and has significant health benefits, and that the 
                                                            
 25. See 21 U.S.C. § 350h(f)(1) (2011) (Tester–Hagan Amendment). 
 26. See Standards for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce For Human 
Consumption, 79 Fed. Reg. 58434-01 (proposed Sep. 29, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 112). 
 27. Public choice theory describes the tendency of government entities (courts, agencies, and 
legislatures) to be more powerfully influenced by organized stakeholders with the most to gain or 
lose from policies and decisions and to marginalize the influence of dispersed interests that collec-
tively have a large interest in the outcome but face organizational impediments. See Richard A. 
Posner, Theories of Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 595 (1974). 
 28. See Wiseman, supra note 23 (discussing the potential public choice implications). Note that 
this is not a comprehensive description of large and small agricultural groups’ views on the FSMA 
or an empirical indication that the majority of large or small agricultural groups held a particular 
view on the FSMA. Agricultural groups submitted comments indicating a spectrum of opinions on 
the FSMA.  
 29. Id. (describing a range of comments on the rules). 
 30. See Gregory M. Schieber, The Food Safety Modernization Act’s Tester Amendment: Useful 
Safe Harbor for Small Farmers and Food Facilities or Weak Attempt at Scale-Appropriate Farm 
and Food Regulations?, 18 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 239, 248 (2013) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 350h(f)(1)). 
 31. See Standards for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce For Human 
Consumption, Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 26 (“[W]e are proposing to 
amend paragraph (a) of proposed § 112.4 to establish that if you are a farm or farm mixed-type facil-
ity with an average annual monetary value of produce (as ‘produce’ is defined in § 112.3(c)) sold 
during the previous 3-year period of more than $25,000 (on a rolling basis), you are a ‘covered farm’ 
subject to this part, and that if you are a ‘covered farm’ subject to this part, you must comply with all 
applicable requirements of this part when you conduct a covered activity on ‘covered produce.’”); 
see also Wiseman, supra note 23 (describing this change). 
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FDA’s ban on interstate sales of raw milk interfered with their right to 
consume food products of their choice.32 
In sum, food safety regulation has followed a winding path, emerg-
ing and sometimes changing in response to various interest groups’ sup-
port and objections. As discussed in Part III, much of this back-and-forth, 
which one could view as involving productive deliberation surrounding 
various food values, would likely be substantially curtailed by a determi-
nation that there was a fundamental right to food, in some cases eviscer-
ating very important safety regulations that were nonetheless not “com-
pelling.”  
B. Food Policy for Public Health 
In addition to addressing food contamination issues, governments 
are increasingly interested in regulating the food supply to address obesi-
ty and other associated public health concerns. For example, the FDA 
has issued food labeling regulations that require chain restaurants and 
operators of vending machines to indicate calorie content on their prod-
ucts.33 The FDA has also proposed amendments to the Nutrition Labeling 
and Education Act that would require food manufacturers to declare any 
“added sugars” on their labels,34 and to change serving sizes so that foods 
and beverages containing 150%–200% of “Reference Amounts Custom-
arily Consumed,” such as large sodas, can no longer be labeled as con-
taining more than one serving35 (a practice that resulted in deceptively 
low values). These rules have met stiff resistance from industry.36 While 
                                                            
 32. Farm-to-Consumer Legal Def. Fund v. Sebelius, 734 F. Supp. 2d 668, 674–75, 678 (N.D. 
Iowa 2010), dismissed for lack of standing No. C 10–4018–MWB, 2012 WL 1079987 (N.D. Iowa 
Mar. 30, 2012). 
 33. Affordable Care Act § 4205, 21 U.S.C. § 343(H)(i)(I)(aa) (2004) (nutrition labeling) (re-
quiring chain restaurants to list the number of calories in each “standard” menu item on menus or 
menu boards, with additional nutrition information in writing, and requiring vending machines to 
post calorie signs where nutrition information cannot be seen “at the point of purchase,” among other 
requirements). 
 34. Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Labels, 79 Fed. Reg. 
11880, 11952 (proposed Mar. 3, 2014), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-03-
03/pdf/2014-04387.pdf. 
 35. Food Labeling: Serving Sizes of Foods That Can Reasonably Be Consumed at One-Eating 
Occasion; Dual-Column Labeling; Updating, Modifying, and Establishing Certain Reference 
Amounts Customarily Consumed; Serving Size for Breath Mints; and Technical Amendments, 79 
Fed. Reg. 11990, 12001 (proposed Mar. 3, 2014), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2014-03-03/pdf/2014-04385.pdf. 
 36. Jennifer Hatcher, senior vice president for government and public affairs at the Food Mar-
keting Institute, explains: “FDA’s proposed menu labeling rule imposes a billion-dollar burden on 
supermarkets, with no additional, quantifiable benefit to supermarket customers, according to FDA’s 
analysis.” Andrea Billups, Food Industry Faces Costly Menu Labeling Rule Under Obamacare, 
NEWSMAX (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/FDA-food-labeling-menu/2013/12/ 
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many of the objections involve legitimate concerns about the practicality 
of labeling foods like pizza—the question of whether every possible top-
ping combination must have a different label is a difficult one—others 
are likely motivated by a concern that revealing calorie counts would in 
some cases reduce profits. 
Bans or taxes on large sugary beverages37 have also become more 
common at the local level, with cities citing numerous health studies 
linking obesity and other health problems to these foods, and document-
ing the health system costs generated by these problems.38 While some 
resistance has come from food choice advocates, who believe that con-
sumers should have the liberty to choose to eat food viewed as “un-
healthy,”39 most of the opposition has emanated from large interest 
groups with high stakes in the outcome of these laws. For example, vari-
ous food associations and chambers of commerce (as well as interests not 
directly associated with large food producer interests, such as the Team-
sters) successfully challenged New York City’s large sugary beverages 
ban in state court, with the court finding that the ban violated the state’s 
separation of powers requirements and was wholly arbitrary.40 
C. Animal Welfare Laws 
A growing number of additional regulations—which, like obesity-
related food laws, have typically been enacted at the local and state lev-
el41—are more concerned with animal welfare than the impacts of food 
on humans. California banned the sale of horsemeat for human consump-
tion in 1998 and the possession or sale of shark fins (prized by some for 
                                                                                                                                     
09/id/540815/. 
 37. See Wiseman, supra note 1, at 740 (describing New York City’s effort to ban large sugary 
beverages). 
 38. See, e.g., Eric A. Finkelstein, Ian C. Fiebelkorn & Guijing Wang, State-Level Estimates of 
Annual Medical Expenditures Attributable to Obesity, 12 OBESITY RES. 18, 21 (2004). 
 39. See, e.g., BAYLEN J. LINNEKIN & MICHAEL BACHMANN, THE ATTACK ON FOOD FREEDOM 
(2014) (arguing that “[a] trans fat ban would violate principles of food freedom,” which in the au-
thors’ view is “the right of every American to grow, raise, produce, buy, sell, share, cook, eat, and 
drink the foods and beverages of their own choosing,” and would make foods “taste worse” as well 
as increase saturated fat content). 
 40. Notice of Verified Petition at 18–19, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Com-
merce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 553584/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Oct. 12, 
2012); N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Men-
tal Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013). 
 41. For a time, Congress banned USDA horsemeat inspections. See Susanna Kim, The Strange 
World of U.S. Horse Meat Regulation, ABC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/find-horse-meat-us/story?id=18598602. 
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their use in soup) in 2011,42 and, along with Chicago (temporarily),43 
banned foie gras, which is the product of force-fed birds. California has 
also, through a referendum supported by 63.5% of voters,44 banned the 
use of small farm animal enclosures.45 The California legislature subse-
quently enacted a law that applied the restrictions on eggs from chickens 
held in small cages to out-of-state eggs.46 Approximately eight other 
states similarly banned the use of small crates for pregnant pigs, and sev-
en states banned veal crates.47 
As with other food-based regulations, these laws have faced chal-
lenges. Farmers in six agriculture-heavy states have sued California, ar-
guing that its egg law is preempted by federal egg safety laws, that the 
law is grounded in economic protectionism, and that the prohibition un-
constitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce.48 
D. Subsidies 
Many food policies rely on monetary support rather than, or in ad-
dition to, regulatory mandates to achieve certain government food-based 
objectives. The U.S. government’s initial efforts to subsidize domestic 
crops began in 1933 with the intention of controlling crop supply and 
thus keeping prices relatively stable for farmers, while more recent farm 
bills have pushed “high-yield production,”49 thus often supporting large 
                                                            
 42. See Wiseman, supra note 1, at 745 n.62 and accompanying text (discussing California’s 
Prohibition of Horse Slaughter and Sale of Horsemeat for Human Consumption Act); Bob Egelko, 
California Shark Fin Ban Upheld by Federal Judge, SF GATE (Mar. 26, 2014, 7:16 AM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/science/article/California-shark-fin-ban-upheld-by-federal-judge-
5348461.php. 
 43. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25982 (West 2012); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 25980 (West 2012) (noting concerns about humane treatment of ducks); Nick Fox, Chicago Over-
turns Foie Gras Ban, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2008, 3:33 PM), http://dinersjournal.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2008/05/14/chicago-overturns-foie-gras-ban/. 
 44. See SENATE FOOD & AGRIC. COMM., S. REP. NO. AB 1437 (Cal. 2009), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_1401-1450/ab_1437_cfa_20090615_204633_sen_ 
comm.html. 
 45. Proposition 2: Standards for Confining Farm Animals (Cal. 2008), available at 
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposed-laws.pdf#prop2. 
 46. AB 1437, 2009 Leg., 10th Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009). 
 47. Lorlei Laird, States Cry Fowl: California’s Ban on Standard-Caged Birds Poses a Chick-
en–Egg Problem, ABA J. ( June 1, 2014, 9:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ 
californias_ban_on_standard-caged_birds_poses_a_chicken-egg_problem. 
 48. Id. (describing the case). 
 49. Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking U.S. Agricultural Policy 
in a Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 597 (2010). 
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agricultural operations—particularly those that grow corn.50 A growing 
and diverse array of interest groups and individuals oppose these subsi-
dies because of their environmental impacts, which arise from growing 
massive quantities of heavily fertilized and carbon-intensive crops,51 of-
ten in marginal soils or areas that otherwise would not have been devoted 
to crop production. Additionally, a growing number of interest groups 
and scholars observe that these subsidies have negative public health ef-
fects, including occupational and consumer pesticide exposure,52 reduced 
availability of nutritionally important non-corn products,53 exacerbation 
of domestic and international hunger problems through “trade distor-
tions,” and the subsidization of crops often fed to livestock rather than 
directly to humans, among other criticisms.54 
More recently, Congress has begun to support certain small and 
sustainable farming operations through the Farm Bill, directing the Sec-
retary of Agriculture to make loans to entities that process, distribute, 
and are otherwise associated with locally or regionally produced agricul-
tural food products.55 This bill, among other things, encourages agricul-
tural practices that reduce soil erosion and preserve wetlands,56 provides 
money for taking certain lands out of production,57 and supports en-
hanced access to farmers’ markets for nutritional assistance (“food 
                                                            
 50. Id. (describing the history of agricultural subsidies in the United States, which began “with 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,” and noting that in the 2008 Farm Bill corn received the 
most subsidies, followed by wheat, cotton, soybeans, and rice). 
 51. Id. at 600; William S. Eubanks II, A Rotten System: Subsidizing Environmental Degrada-
tion and Poor Public Health with Our Nation’s Tax Dollars, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 213, 240–72 
(2009) (describing impacts of federally subsidized agriculture on soil, habitats, water, and air); see 
also Linda Breggin & D. Bruce Meyers, Jr., Subsidies with Responsibilities, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 487 (2013) (describing nutrient pollution that has caused a “dead zone” in the Gulf of Mexico 
where most aquatic species cannot survive, pesticide pollution, and other environmental impacts of 
“industrialized” agriculture supported by U.S. subsidies). 
 52. Eubanks II, supra note 51, at 276. 
 53. Id. at 281–82. 
 54. Id. at 235–36. 
 55. 7 U.S.C. § 1932 (2014). 
 56. See  Environmental Quality Incentives Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.nrcs. 
usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/financial/eqip/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2015) (describ-
ing how the Farm Bill supports the Environmental Quality Incentives Program, through which the 
USDA and its state and county offices “provide financial assistance to help plan and implement 
conservation practices that address natural resource concerns and for opportunities to improve soil, 
water, plant, animal, air and related resources on agricultural land and non-industrial private for-
estland”); see also Galey & Endres, supra note 15, at 14–16 (providing a history of congressional 
establishment of agricultural conservation programs). 
 57. See Galey & Endres, supra note 15, at 15 (describing this 2008 Farm Bill development and 
other congressional support for more sustainable agricultural practices). 
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stamp”) customers.58 While these programs have been criticized for the 
minor amount of money they receive in comparison to subsidies for large 
agriculture,59 they show that Congress has begun to acknowledge more 
food consumer values through its subsidization of the food supply. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO FOOD CHOICE 
The government’s pervasive involvement in the food supply and 
our daily food consumption choices profoundly affects both producers—
large and small, organic and industrial—and consumers. And few stake-
holders, if any, are entirely satisfied with the status quo. Some have re-
acted to the government’s involvement by proposing a fundamental right 
to food choice, arguing that individuals have a right to “food liberty”—a 
right to decide the types and amounts of foods that they consume.60 I 
have argued elsewhere that courts are unlikely to recognize such a 
right,61 but the question I address here is whether liberty of palate62 is a 
goal worth pursuing. The results, which would eviscerate many re-
strictions on food availability and content, would likely please the true 
food libertarians—those that would support an individual’s right to 
choose whether or not to consume foods deemed by some to be danger-
ous, and who are equally supportive of ensuring consumers’ access to 
raw, locally sourced milk, food trucks, and mass-produced donuts that 
                                                            
 58. See USDA Food & Nutrition Serv., supra note 15 (“As a result of funding provided by 
Congress through the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2012, USDA last 
year announced the availability of $4 million in funding to expand the availability of wireless point-
of-sale equipment in farmers markets not currently accepting SNAP [Supplemental Nutrition Assis-
tance Program] benefits.”). 
 59. See Galey & Endres, supra note 15, at 32 (noting that “[t]he grant programs that benefit 
local food systems are not sufficiently funded to cover the number of farms that want to participate” 
and that “the status quo of major subsidies to large-scale, industrialized producers of commodity 
crops was preserved”). 
 60. See, e.g., David J. Berg, Food Choice Is a Fundamental Liberty Right, 9 J. FOOD L. & 
POL’Y 173, 190 (2013) (arguing for an “individual’s right to purchase meat and poultry directly from 
the person who raised and participated in the slaughtering of that meat or poultry without mandatory 
governmental inspection”); LINNEKIN & BACHMANN, supra note 39, at 21 (arguing that “[a] key 
element of economic liberty is food freedom—your right to grow, raise, produce, buy, sell, share, 
cook, eat and drink what you want”); see also Schindler, supra note 10 (describing the challenge of 
balancing legitimate liberty interests against “public health justifications” for certain food regula-
tion). 
 61. See Wiseman, supra note 1; see also Schindler, supra note 10, at 35–36 (describing liber-
tarian and food sovereignty arguments against regulation of pop-up restaurants and supper clubs); 
Baylen J. Linnekin, The “California Effect” and the Future of American Food: How California’s 
Growing Crackdown on Food & Agriculture Harms the State & the Nation, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 357, 
387–88 (2010). 
 62. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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contain trans fats.63 But for many who are part of the sustainable food 
movement—who are concerned not just with the ability to eat whatever 
they wish, but also with the health and environmental impacts of the food 
system—a fundamental right to food would likely do more harm than 
good.64 Substantial infringements of fundamental rights trigger strict 
scrutiny,65 under which many, if not all, of these regulations would fail. 
The required showing that a law is narrowly tailored is a high hurdle, 
even if a compelling government interest exists, thus potentially sweep-
ing away many of these long-deliberated laws, and very likely chilling 
new, potentially beneficial laws. Moreover, as recent experience with the 
First Amendment has reminded us, corporate and moneyed interests and 
the skilled lawyers who represent them are adept at using the Constitu-
tion to free themselves from regulatory restraints,66 and, in the food con-
text, industry has little to lose and much to gain.  
Of course, in some cases a fundamental food right would give sus-
tainable food interests a powerful tool—particularly where governmental 
regulation hinders the sale of healthy, clearly-labeled food from local 
farmers.67 But as this Part discusses, it seems likely that a larger number 
of desirable regulations would be constitutionally suspect. 
This Part explores the implications of recognizing a fundamental 
right to food choice for the issues described in Part II, concluding that, 
                                                            
 63. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 60, at 190 (focusing on the right to buy food directly from pro-
ducers or meat slaughterers “without mandatory governmental inspection”); LINNEKIN & 
BACHMANN, supra note 39, at 10 (“A growing number of these truly awful food regulations are 
evident at the federal, state and local level—from regulations prohibiting farmers from advertising 
unpasteurized milk to laws protecting brick-and-mortar restaurants against competition from food 
trucks. These laws—and many others—act as a direct assault on economic liberty and food free-
dom.”); Comment, Baylen J. Linnekin, Director, Keep Food Legal, Comments Opposing the FDA’s 
Tentative Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils, Docket No. FDA-2013-N-1317 
(Mar. 7, 2014), available at http://www.keepfoodlegal.org/PDFs/kfl_transfat_comments.pdf (“A 
trans fat ban would violate principles of food freedom[.] Keep Food Legal advocates in favor of food 
freedom—the right of every American to grow, raise, produce, buy, sell, share, cook, eat, and drink 
the foods and beverages of their own choosing.”). 
 64. See Tai, supra note 11, at 1076–78 (documenting a variety of goals and values associated 
with the sustainable food movement, including avoiding the health and environmental effects of the 
use of chemicals in food production; limiting “food miles” to reduce energy use and increase access 
to fresh food and support for local farmers; and the enjoyment of fresh, natural, and sustainably 
produced foods). For discussion of the safety and environmental regulations that might not survive 
strict scrutiny or even intermediate scrutiny, see infra Part III.B. 
 65. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (noting that 
impingement “upon a fundamental right” requires “strict judicial scrutiny”). 
 66. See infra Part III.A. 
 67. See, e.g., Order Rejecting Motion to Dismiss, Ocheesee Creamery v. Putnam & Newton, 
CASE NO. 4:14cv621-RH/CAS (N.D. Fl., Feb. 9, 2015) (rejecting a motion to dismiss a First 
Amendment challenge to a Florida regulation that prohibits a farmer from labeling as “skim milk” 
milk that has simply had the cream skimmed off the top and has not had vitamin A added). 
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on the whole, it would not advance the values of the sustainable food 
movement. 
A. The Commercial First Amendment 
The First Amendment, while protecting some of the most funda-
mental U.S. freedoms, has also been invoked by wealthy and corporate 
interests (as well as smaller interests68) to strike down laws and regula-
tions many regard as beneficial. Most prominently, the Supreme Court 
has in the last few years undone large portions of campaign finance regu-
lations.69 Relatedly, pharmaceutical manufacturers persuaded the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 2011 that limiting the distribution of pharmacy records 
showing physicians’ prescribing practices was not content neutral, and 
that the state’s interests in protecting doctors’ and patients’ privacy did 
not justify the “burden . . . on protected expression.”70 In the food con-
text, the relatively large actors within the industry have successfully 
raised First Amendment objections to the FDA’s regulation of health 
claims for dietary supplements,71 and have more recently opposed gov-
ernment efforts to combat obesity.72 
The merits of broad protection for commercial speech can, of 
course, be reasonably debated.73 However, it is not necessary to resolve 
that debate to conclude that industry groups are adept at using the Consti-
tution to fight regulation, and that the Supreme Court has recently been 
sympathetic to their arguments. If a fundamental right to food liberty 
were recognized, the food industry would be quick to take advantage. As 
                                                            
 68. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  
 69. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 
(2014). 
 70. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2668 (2011); see also Tamara Piety, “A 
Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2012) (dis-
cussing the case). 
 71. See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Rebecca L. Goldberg, 
Administering Real Food: How the Eat-Food Movement Should—and Should Not—Approach Gov-
ernment Regulation, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 773, 829 n.239 (2012) (collecting cases); David C. Vladeck, 
Devaluing Truth: Unverified Health Claims in the Aftermath of Pearson v. Shalala, 54 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 535, 538 (1999). 
 72. See Samantha Graff & Tamara Piety, The New First Amendment and its Implications for 
Combating Obesity Through Regulations of Advertising, in ADVANCES IN COMMUNICATION 
RESEARCH TO REDUCE CHILDHOOD OBESITY (Jerome D. Williams, Keryn E. Pasch & Chiquita 
Collins eds., 2013) (“Obesity prevention advocates are finding that any policy proposal relating to 
junk food advertising—even government recommendations on the nutritional profile of foods that 
are appropriate to market to children—will be met with aggressive objections that corporations’ 
expressive rights are under siege.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Tamara Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2583 (2008). 
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discussed below, the industry has much to gain, often at the expense of 
the interests of the sustainable food movement. 
B. The Effects of Strict Scrutiny on Food Policy 
Requiring the FDA to satisfy strict scrutiny for every regulation in 
the food safety arena would be an enormous burden. Strict scrutiny 
would limit the government’s ability to intervene except to prevent very 
serious harms, and even then only once it had amassed compelling evi-
dence.74 Many restrictions on the use of pesticides and food additives 
would be susceptible to challenge. Litigants might, for example, chal-
lenge the FDA’s basis for these laws by pointing out difficulties in trans-
lating animal studies to human health impacts.75 More broadly, it is ques-
tionable whether preventing a relatively low risk of cancer constitutes a 
compelling interest.76 Prohibitions of trans fats in food, then, could well 
lack an adequately compelling interest and narrowly tailored solution, 
despite many studies linking these substances with health problems.77 
Further, evaluating these types of regulations, which involve highly 
technical scientific issues, will be difficult for judges to accurately as-
sess. Government efforts to combat obesity through taxes or bans on 
added sugars, as well as to prevent disease outbreaks by banning or limit-
ing the sale of unpasteurized milk products, would likely fail as well. 
Although the risk of harm from these products is hotly debated,78 in ei-
                                                            
 74. Some particularly compelling regulations, such as those directly combatting fraudulent 
labeling, would of course withstand strict scrutiny. But as discussed in this Essay, even regulations 
designed to squelch questionable health claims have been deemed to violate the First Amendment. 
See, e.g., supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 75. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 170.39 (2014) (providing that to be exempted from regulation as a 
food additive, “[t]he substance must . . . not contain a carcinogenic impurity or, if it does, must not 
contain a carcinogenic impurity with a TD50 value based on chronic feeding studies reported in the 
scientific literature or otherwise available to the Food and Drug Administration of less than 6.25 
milligrams per kilogram bodyweight per day”). 
 76. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-246, FOOD SAFETY: FDA 
SHOULD STRENGTHEN ITS OVERSIGHT OF FOOD INGREDIENTS DETERMINED TO BE GENERALLY 
RECOGNIZED AS SAFE (GRAS) 22 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-246 
(noting an FDA ban on one food ingredient based on evidence of the ingredient causing cancer in 
mice). 
 77. See, e.g., Alberto Ascherio et al., Trans-Fatty Acids Intake and Risk of Myocardial Infarc-
tion, 89 CIRCULATION 94 (1994); Dariush Mozaffarian et al., Trans Fatty Acids and Cardiovascular 
Disease, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1601, 1601 (2006); Alberto Ascherio et al., Shining the Spotlight on 
Trans Fats, HARV. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/nutritionsource/transfats/ 
(referencing these and other studies) (last visited Mar. 23, 2015). 
 78. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 1 (describing raw milk advocates’ arguments regarding 
health benefits of raw milk and the FDA’s safety concerns associated with raw milk). 
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ther case it seems unlikely to be proven to be great enough to rise to the 
level of a compelling interest.79 
More broadly, crafting regulations to survive strict scrutiny would 
be a crippling administrative burden. The FDA arguably already suffers 
from the “ossification” problems identified in the administrative law lit-
erature,80 in which agencies subject to supposedly deferential review un-
der the Chevron standard are still required to amass vast quantities of 
information to adequately support a rule.81 Adding another extremely 
stringent layer of review to this already constrained regulatory process 
would likely have a chilling effect—preventing the FDA from drafting 
any rules that would have difficulty standing up to strict scrutiny review, 
and even those rules that might survive a fundamental rights challenge. 
Indeed, the FDA has already indicated that it will not prioritize food la-
beling laws in light of the difficulty of navigating First Amendment con-
cerns,82 and adding yet another fundamental right would further chill the 
FDA’s will to regulate. With the recognition of a fundamental right to 
food, FDA rules would face a flood of eager litigants—many of them 
likely from large industry, which has the highest stakes in many food 
regulations—who would now have an unusually powerful tool at their 
disposal. Thus, while some food safety regulations affecting small farm-
ers and traditional agricultural techniques would probably be struck 
down as well, a primary result seems likely to be an increase in the use of 
chemicals and additives in all stages of food production due to decreased 
regulation, a result hardly consonant with the goals of much of the sus-
tainable food movement.83 
The fate of animal welfare laws would likely be mixed. Categorical 
bans on products like foie gras and shark fins would require courts to 
determine whether the animal suffering inherent in their production is 
                                                            
 79. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 70 (describing how doctor and patient privacy was 
not an adequately compelling interest to justify limits on the distribution of pharmacy records show-
ing doctors’ prescribing practices). 
 80. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385, 1387 (1992); but see Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethink-
ing Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 483 (1997) (agreeing generally that the rulemaking process is cumbersome but suggesting 
other drivers, and arguing that certain agency actions circumventing rulemaking can be problematic). 
 81. McGarity, supra note 80. 
 82. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-597, FDA LABELING: FDA NEEDS TO 
BETTER LEVERAGE RESOURCES, IMPROVE OVERSIGHT, AND EFFECTIVELY USE AVAILABLE DATA 
TO HELP CONSUMERS SELECT HEALTHY FOODS 61 (2008), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08597.pdf (noting a First Amendment decision striking down 
FDA’s regulation of potentially misleading claims on health supplements). 
 83. See Tai, supra note 11; see also Goldberg, supra note 71, at 738 (“It goes without saying 
that the eat-food movement would have us avoid all such highly processed ‘foodlike’ substances.”). 
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enough to overcome the newly fundamental right to consume them.84 
Measures aimed at improving the lives of food animals—like Califor-
nia’s requirement that animal cages allow animals to stand up and move 
their limbs—which reduce (by raising production costs) but do not elim-
inate access to food, might not be held to sufficiently infringe the right, 
although large agricultural interests would no doubt litigate this point 
extensively. 
Finally, agricultural subsidies, which primarily benefit large com-
modity growers, could well survive a right-to-consume challenge 
brought on the basis that it distorts the food supply and favors some 
foods over others. Although the caselaw is far from clear, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly recognized that the government has a greater ability 
to subsidize than it does to directly regulate.85 As the Court said in Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: 
Congress may “selectively fund a program to encourage certain ac-
tivities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same 
time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the 
problem in another way.” In doing so, “the Government has not dis-
criminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund 
one activity to the exclusion of the other.” 86 
Similarly, favoring commodities over produce would likely be a 
permissible choice to fund certain crops over others. Here, too, food 
manufacturing interests would likely come out ahead.87 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A small yet influential group of scholars has begun to explore the 
limits of litigation under existing law to advance the varied and occa-
sionally conflicting goals of the sustainable food movement.88 Faced 
with seemingly discriminatory laws inhibiting access to local or natural 
                                                            
 84. Cf. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (holding a federal statute prohibiting 
depictions of animal cruelty unconstitutional on First Amendment overbreadth grounds). 
 85. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–88 (1998); see also Maher 
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977) (“There is a basic difference between direct state interference with 
a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative 
policy.”). 
 86. Finley, 524 U.S. at 587–88 (citations omitted) (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 
(1991)). 
 87. Some alternatives would remain. For example, if courts struck down numerous food safety 
regulations litigants could seek private law remedies for harm caused by contaminated foods. But 
causation is, inter alia, difficult to establish (even regulators with relatively broad inspection powers 
sometimes have difficulty tracing down the source of bacteria in food). 
 88. See Tai, supra note 11; Goldberg, supra note 71. 
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foods, the strong medicine of fundamental rights may seem appealing to 
this movement. On the whole, however, despite its theoretical basis in 
individual liberty, agribusiness and the food industry would likely be the 
chief beneficiaries of a fundamental right to food choice.89 The interests 
of the sustainable food movement, and society as a whole, on the other 
hand, would suffer. This is not, ultimately, particularly surprising; the 
application of strict scrutiny to laws infringing fundamental rights is 
premised on the idea that those rights are so important that they must be 
judicially protected against even well-meaning legislative and executive 
incursions. Freedom of speech, even if it is interpreted to require unlim-
ited campaign contributions, may be worth this price. Getting to eat 
whatever we want is, in practice, probably not worth the price, no matter 
how attractive or intuitive food liberty may be as an abstract concept. 
If there is no magic bullet for achieving food system reform, there 
is still some cause for hope in the legislative and regulatory process, as 
shown, however imperfectly, by the history of the passage and imple-
mentation (so far) of the FSMA. Small farm advocates successfully lob-
bied for the inclusion of the Tester–Hagan Amendment,90 and in the 
rulemaking process the FDA has appeared to take the many comments 
and concerns of sustainable food advocates seriously.91 It met with nu-
merous stakeholders and substantially changed the regulations based on 
comments received—in some cases, the changes were sweeping. For ex-
ample, when sustainable and small farmers objected to the inclusion of 
all food, rather than just produce, in calculating the sales threshold for 
exemption from the Produce Rule, the FDA made the requested change 
in the face of opposition from both large agricultural and public health 
groups.92 Piecemeal litigation and engagement in the political and regula-
tory processes may be harder, slower, and less exciting than rallying 
around an asserted fundamental right, but ultimately it is far more pro-
ductive. 
                                                            
 89. See supra note 10. 
 90. See Wiseman, supra note 23. 
 91. See id. (discussing EPA’s responses to comments). 
 92. See id.; Standards for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce 
for Human Consumption, 79 Fed. Reg. 58433 (proposed Sept. 9, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pt. 112), available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm334114.htm. 
